Bolivia: A Profound Breakdown of Communication with Latin America

COHA - Council on Hemispheric Affairs
September 16th, 2008

Bolivia: A Profound Breakdown of Communication with Latin America

• Upwards of Thirty Dead in Bolivia
• The Unforgivable has Again Happened, The Taking of Innocent Life
• Was the Expulsion of the U.S. Ambassador Inevitable?
• The import of UNASUR’s Strong but Dignified Role

With UNASUR having just met in Santiago, Chile to discuss the escalatingcrisis in Bolivia, the stage is set for a huge surge of autonomy forLatin America, owing to a series of newly auto-generated, self-managedand extensive regional initiatives. In an extraordinary shift from adecades-long hegemonic status-quo during which Washington exercised defacto hemispheric supremacy, the U.S. role has dramatically diminished,at times becoming almost irrelevant. In fact, even though U.S. AssistantSecretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs, Thomas Shannon, is arelatively enlightened figure who at times has stressed a rationaldialogue between Venezuela, Bolivia, and Washington, U.S. attentiontoward the region, when at all focused, has been willful, narrow-minded,and self-absorbed.Once installed in office, the Bush administration found itselfdistracted from Latin American issues by the Iraq war, giving the regionthe required space to develop its own consensus on regionaldevelopments, regardless of Washington’s ululations.

This has heightenedthe ability of hemispheric leaders to halt or reverse some of the most imprudent U.S. policies that had gained ascendancy starting in the Clinton administration, and which then blossomed under Bush. Nevertheless, despite all signs to the contrary, the Bush administrationcontinues to act as if its fiat still is supreme in Latin America, when,in fact, it has rapidly shrunk. An example of this is the revival of the Fourth Fleet as a Washington policy riposte, and with it the pretense ofgunboat diplomacy on the ready, after a half-a-century of the fleetbeing dismasted, and the use of the “terrorism” factor to reassert anauthority that is no longer exercisable.Washington cannot continue to conduct itself as if it had a backyard inwhich Latin America could be firmly found. The U.S. has been absent fromthe region for far too long to attempt to roll back the tide ofanti-private capital, anti-U.S. sentiment that has swept over much ofthe region. In its stead, the region yearns for a “third way” and forchange. In fact, during this period of unilateral neglect, due to Iraq,the hemispheres started going its own way, coming up with new formulasin its quest to diversify relationships, pluralize its world tradecontracts and engage in constructive relations across the board,including forming ties to what Washington, at the time, sees as “rogue”nations.

During this period of transition, more left-leaning presidentswere being elected president than ever before in the Americas’ history,a raft of regional organizations (which did not include the U.S. as amember) were formed, the region suddenly saw a remarkable rise in itsimportance on the world stage as its metal and agricultural commoditiesincreased in relevancy and value during the current fuel and foodcrisis, and new links emerged between Latin America and India, China,Russia, and the EU.

The Breakdown of Bilateral Relations
The latest U.S. flare-up with Bolivia most likely could have beenavoided by a non-pro forma U.S. statement categorically declaring thatthis country would neither recognize nor have any form of relationshipwith the Santa Cruz-led breakaway departments in the Europerized,somewhat white and wealthy eastern sector of the country, just as Braziland the other Latin American nations saw fit to do. Instead, for anumber of months U.S. Ambassador Philip Goldberg assumed the role ofquarterback at meetings with the opposition, discussing strategies withhis team. He did this even though the opposition figures had clearlycalled for extra-constitutional actions against democratically-electedEvo Morales, even his ouster, and in spite of the fact that hiswidespread support was affirmed in July’s recall elections. (For moreinformation, see COHA Research Associates Chris Sweeney and JessicaBryant’s article, “Bolivia in Crisis”).http://www.coha.org/2008/08/bolivia-in-crisis/

Washington claims that Goldberg’s meetings with the opposition wereprotocolic and conducted during routine visits to the secessionistregions. It also insisted that he categorically denies La Paz’saccusations of his signaling support behind the opposition, let aloneany involvement in secret plots against the central government. Yet,complicating matters in the Andean country is the fact that any numberof U.S. ambassadors throughout Latin America –particularly dating backto the inauguration of the present U.S. administration– have a lengthyrecord of intervention in the domestic affairs of the countries to whichthey have been accredited. It is no secret that the State Department hashad a long history of inappropriate and often covert intervention inLatin American internal affairs, often making use of a Reagan-erainstitutional facility known as the National Endowment for Democracy. Goldberg’s predecessors, Manuel Rocha and David Greenlee, persistentlyinserted themselves into Bolivian domestic issues. This scenario often involved U.S. ambassadors on station elsewhere in the region, where theyopenly threatening the end of remittances, trade benefits, or U.S.development assistance to a given country, if a leftist regime waselected to office –El Salvador and Nicaragua would be some examples ofthese. They also have pressured conservative political parties in suchcountries as Bolivia, El Salvador and Nicaragua to unite behind onecandidate in order not to split the vote, allowing the otherwise weakerleftist candidate to ship into office.Ultimately, a historical memory was invoked of humiliation, plunder and such transgressions as the Chaco war and a spate of U.S.-backed military Juntas under which the largely aboriginal majority of Bolivians have suffered as a result of self-serving past U.S. policies. Such acts ofarrogance and intolerance that Washington recurrently has visited uponthe region, served to incite the unbridled passions of a man with theBrobdingnagian temper of Hugo Chávez and even the more self-disciplined Evo Morales.

Washington Diplomacy or Lack of it
In Washington’s eye, there always has been a distinction to be madebetween Evo Morales and his Venezuelan counterpart. While they are verydifferent in temperament and style, the two share some majorsimilarities, one of them being a sense of loyalty and solidarity withone another. What has made them into slippery fish for the Bushadministration to handle is that no matter how garish may be theirpersonal stylistic flaws, neither Chávez or Morales can in any manner becondemned for any democratic lapses, lack of human rights observance, nor mistreatment nor abuse of their citizens. You may consider them confrontational non-conformists, or condemn them for their non-adherenceto traditional codes of diplomatic behavior, but you cannot cite themfor being antipathetic in their behavior towards their own people. Surely there was enough here of democratic substance with which the U.S.could do business. It is clear that the U.S. remains largely oblivious to the multifaceteddevelopments that are taking place in an increasingly self-confidentLatin America. Washington would do well to introduce a sense ofperspective on Iraq and terrorism, and turn its attention once again toits vital national interests in this hemisphere. These issues go farbeyond drugs, terrorism and security concerns. If the U.S. is to play aconstructive role there, it must architect a new relationship with theregion that can be deemed credible and taken to heart. Its investmentmust be more than just a Parthian shot aimed at a token act of respectfor their sovereignty and must display an earnest concern for the area’s well-being.

UNASUR’s Debuting Role
If such a re-positioning does not happen soon, it may well be too latefor Washington to develop cooperative and mutually beneficial policies.Latin American-led trade agreements such as the Bolivarian Alternativefor the Americas (ALBA) could appear more sensitive and better adaptedto regional well-being than any U.S.-crafted free trade agreement withnations that are too weak, like Costa Rica and Panama, to defend theirauthentic self-interests against subsidized U.S. farm products. Also,the fledgling Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) joins theOrganization of American States as a multilateral, democratic bodycapable of facilitating regional integration and conflict resolution.The difference is, of course, that the former does not include the U.S.as a member. It is this stunning difference that ultimately could leadto the supplanting of the OAS by UNASUR a development that would be sureto lead to the return of Cuba to a major regional body. At its September15 emergency meeting on the Bolivia crisis in Santiago demonstrates, theleaders of this multilateral organization are capable of engaging inconstructive and balanced dialogue that is certain to profoundly affectthe separatists. Refusing to fall prey to the mudslinging in which U.S. diplomacy frequently engages, Ecuadorian President Rafael Correadismissed probing by the press into the possibility of covert U.S.intervention in Bolivia, a charge that Correa himself was not making inother contexts, and he reiterated the support of member states to therestoration of order and preservation of unity in Bolivia.

Washington and the Bolivian Blow Up
The near breakdown of relations between Washington and La Paz in themidst of the Bolivia crisis, perfectly exemplifies the disastrousconsequences of the inherent intolerance and disrespect that the U.S. has long exhibited towards the region. Despite La Paz and Washington’sideological differences, Assistant Secretary Shannon, while being a verysignificant improvement over his two most recent predecessors, OttoReich and Roger Noriega, might have used this opportunity to moreclearly indicate a U.S. commitment to the spirit as well as the letterof democratically-elected governance in the region, and that any form ofseparatism would be condemn. More vigorous support of Morales and thecentral government in the face of the reckless and greedy same plan ofthe pro-autonomy leaders in Bolivia might have provided a compellingreason for the secessionists to preserve order and avoid the violencewhich, tragically, has already claimed upwards of thirty lives.

This analysis was prepared by COHA Director Larry Birns and COHA Research Associate Raylsiyaly Rivero
September 16th, 2008